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Abstract 
Based on an ongoing attempt to integrate Natural Language instructions with human 
figure animation, we demonstrate that agents' understanding and use of instructions can 
complement what they can derive from the environment in which they act. We focus on 
two attitudes that contribute to agents' behavior - their intentions and their expectations 
- and shown how Natural Language instructions contribute to such attitudes in ways that 
complement the environment. We also show that instructions can require more than one 
context of interpretation and thus that agents' understanding of instructions can evolve as 
their activity progresses. A significant consequence is that Natural Language understanding 
in the context of behavior cannot simply be treated as "front end" processing, but rather 
must be integrated more deeply into the processes that guide an agent's behavior and 
respond to its perceptions. 
1 Introduction 
This is a short position paper on what we have learned about language, behavior and the 
environment from an ongoing attempt to  use Natural Language instructions t o  guide the task- 
related behavior of animated human figures. While the project, AnimNL (for "Animation and 
Natural Language") is not yet ready to deliver a prototype, we believe that what we have so far 
learned from this attempt to  produce a complete vertical integration from language to animated 
behavior will be of interest and benefit to  others as well. 
AnimNL builds upon the JackTM animation system developed at the University of Pennsyl- 
vania's Computer Graphics Research Laboratory. In Jack, animation follows from model-based 
*The authors would like to  thank Brett Achorn, Breck Baldwin, Welton Becket, Moon Jung, Michael White,  
a n d  Xinmin Zhao, all of whom have contributed greatly to  the  current version of AnimNL. We would also like 
t o  thank Phil  Agre, Joseph Rosenzweig, Jeffrey Siskind, Mark Steedman, Michael White, and  two anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on  the many drafts this paper has gone through. The  research has  been partially 
supported by ARO Grant DAAL03-89-C-0031 including participation by the  U.S. Army Research Laboratory 
(Aberdeen), Natick Laboratory, and  the  Institute for Simulation and Training; U.S. Air Force DEPTH contract 
through Hughes Missile Systems F33615-91-C-0001; DMSO through the University of Iowa; National Defense 
Science and  Engineering Graduate Fellowship in  Computer Science DAAL03-92-G-0342; NSF Grant IRI91-17110, 
CISE Grant CDA88-22719, and  Instrumentationand Laboratory Improvement Program Grant USE-9152503, and 
DARPA grant N00014-90-J-186. 
simulation of virtual agents acting in an environment. The agents of primary interest are Jack's 
biomechanically reasonable and anthropometrically-scaled human models (see Figure 1). The 
models have 138 joints, including an accurate torso, and a growing repertoire of naturalistic 
behaviors such as walking, stepping, looking, reaching, turning, grasping, strength-based lifting, 
and both obstacle and self-collision avoidance 151. Each of these behaviors is environmentally 
reactive. That  is, incremental computation is able to  adjust an agent's performance t o  the situ- 
ation, as the situation progresses, without further involvement of the higher level processes [lo] 
unless an exceptional failure condition is signaled. Different limits can be placed on an agent's 
vision, strength and comfort threshold, for more realistic environmental response, and different 
environments can easily be constructed, so as to vary the situations in which the figures are 
acting.' 
With these features, we believe that Jack can provide a fairly realistic target for linking 
Natural Language with behavior. This is because Jack agents "naturally" face limits on their 
ability to  understand Natural Language utterances, much as people do: their ability t o  under- 
stand language relies on their knowledge, their knowledge is mediated by what they can perceive, 
and their perception is limited. Moreover, since Jack agents can, like people, effect changes on 
their world, their understanding of language can evolve through intentional activity in the world 
(cf. Section 2). 
From our work with Jack, what we have been led to believe about language, behavior and 
the environment is that 
Just as an agent may be motivated by its environment to  consider adopting particular 
goals as intentions that will guide it subsequent behavior, so an agent may also be moti- 
vated by Natural Language instructions. Moreover, goals recognized as being situationally 
relevant either through perceiving the environment or processing instructions, can clarify 
the meaning of other instructions. (Huffman and Laird 1321 see a similar complementarity 
of roles between language and the environment in an agent's acquisition of procedural 
knowledge.) 
Just as an agent uses its perception of the current environment to  augment its knowledge 
and guide its current behavior, so too can an agent use expectations derived from instruc- 
tions about how a situation will evolve, to augment its beliefs and guide its current and 
future behavior. 
Intentions and expectations can complement one another. Intentions can embody an agent's 
expectations that the agent can act in ways to satisfy those intentions, while expectations can 
lead an agent to  form intentions to  check that those expectations are satisfied and to take 
corrective actions if not. 
l In discussing agents, we will use the pronoun 'Lhe", since we will be using a male figure in our illustrated 
example - i.e., a figure with male body proportions. The Jack  animation system provides anthropometrically 
sizable female figures as well. 
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Three caveats are necessary here: one involving the quality of everyday instructions, a second 
involving the sources of an agent's intentions, and a third involving the existence of a distinct 
"instructor". 
First, the task of formulating instructions is clearly not without problems for human language 
users, as the prevalence of incomprehensible and/or useless instructions shows. Two of our own 
favorites are: 
"Replace items on vehicle with items contained in this kit." (ANCO Replacement 
Windshield-Washer Pump, Stock No. 61-14) 
"To access the next highest programmed station setting, or to  switch to  a lower pro- 
grammed station, the SCAN buttons must be repeatedly pressed." (VCR, Mitsubishi 
Electronics) 
There are many possible things to  blame for the prevalance of poor instructions, including (1) 
the prevalence of poor writing, in general; (2) a writer's inability to be too specific, because 
they lack detailed knowledge of the exact situation in which the task will be carried out; and 
(3) the difficulty people have in converting narrative accounts of past behavior or experience 
into effective instructions for future behavior. (Recall, for example, the joke about the bus rider 
who asks a fellow passenger where he should get off for City Hall. The latter replies, "Just get 
off one stop before I do".) 
While significant work is being done to improve the quality of instructions [3, 25, 17, 45, 461, 
in the end, one may have to  accept that no fixed instruction set can serve all agents in all 
situations. 
Secondly, real agents will always have additional intentions that come from sources other 
than instructions: intentions arise from personal goals and desires, as well as from the policies 
(social, governmental, etc.) an agent agrees to  adhere to. However, we have simplified the 
situation to  one of semi-autonomous agents who have no other intentions than those that follow 
from their given instructions. This does not mean, however, that nothing else influences their 
behavior. Since Jack agents are environmentally reactive, features in the changing environment 
affect their behavior as well. For example, an agent instructed to  go to the door may also have 
to  take action to  avoid obstacles it finds blocking its way. In future work, we plan to address 
instructions that convey general policy, and to  allow it to affect agent behavior as well. For 
animated agent behavior that follows from particular personality traits, the reader is referred 
to  work by Bates et al. [9, 371 and by Morawetz [14]. 
Thirdly, in real life there is often no distinct instructor around. In the case of multi-person 
tasks, this means the conduct of a task is often a product of negotiation by the participants, 
each with their own knowledge and beliefs [29, 471. The intentions and expections of any one of 
them then may then reflect what has been negotiated by the group. We argue though that the 
situation with a distinct instructor can show more simply that instructions can allow an agent 
t o  form beliefs about the world that it can act on with relative confidence. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss plans and instructions 
in general, as well as some related work. We also give a brief overview of AnimNL, in support 
of the points we will be making about instructions, intentions and expectations. Intentions are 
then discussed in Section 3, and Expectations in Section 4. 
2 Background 
2.1 Plans and Instructions 
Early views of Natural Language instructions corresponded to  the early views of plans: instruc- 
tions were treated as specifying nodes of a plan that,  when completely expanded into primitive 
action specifications, would control agent behavior. This view, for example, underlies SHRDLU's 
successful response to instructions such as "Pick up the green pyramid and put i t  in the box" 
1541. 
Tha t  plans should not be viewed as control structures has already been well argued by Agre 
and Chapman [I], Pollack [42], Suchman [48], and others in the field. Agre and Chapman show 
that when people form plans in response to instructions, they appear to  use those plans as 
resources. The actual task situation may then lead them to interpolate additional actions not 
mentioned in the instructions, to  replace actions specified in the instructions with other ones 
that seem better suited to  the situation, and to ground referring terms as a consequence of their 
actions rather than as a precondition for them. Other researchers, working in what has come 
to be called a BDI framework ("beliefs, desires and intentions") now view planning in terms of 
agents adopting (and dropping) intentions to  act [13, 16, 29, 431. 
A plan's relationship with a set of instructions is also not rigid. It  depends, inter alia on 
various features of the instructions, including: 
whether the instructions convey doctrine (general policy regarding behavior in some range 
of situations) or procedure (actions to be taken now or at some specified time in the future); 
in the case of procedural instructions, whether they are given before, during, or after action; 
whether the instructions are meant as advice, suggestion, order, request, warning, or tuto- 
rial. 
These features are apparent in recent work involving instructed agents. For example, in Chap- 
man's work [15], instructions are given as advice to agents already engaged in an activity. They 
are treated as additional evidence for an action alternative already identified by the agent as be- 
ing relevant to  the current situation. That alternative may not, however, be taken immediately 
(or ever) if other alternatives have more evidence in their favor. Chapman derives this view 
from observing how arcade game players follow instructions given to them by kibbitzers watch- 
ing them play. (Chapman also notes that negative instructions can be similarly understood as 
evidence against actions.) 
Vere and Bickmore treat most instructions to their "basic agent", Homer, as orders to  carry 
out specific tasks [50]. However, they have also enabled Homer to interpret negative instructions 
as policy that can override orders that conflict with it. They give an example in which Homer 
(a  small submarine) is told not to leave its island, and it subsequently refuses to  comply with 
an instruction to  take a picture of the Codfish (a ship) because to  do so would require leaving 
the island. 
Work by Alterman and his students [2] shows how instructions given after an incorrect action 
has been performed are treated as assistance, helping agents to accommodate their existing 
routines to  the device currently at hand. In this approach, routines evolved over many different 
instances of engagement help focus an agent on the details of the situation that require attention 
and on the decisions that must be made. Instructions may interrupt activity to  call attention 
to  other relevant details or decisions, or to correct decisions already made. Neither plans nor 
instructions function as control structures that determine the agent's behavior. 
Our own work has focussed on procedural instructions given to agents before undertaking a 
task. Such intructioiis can be found i11 user's manuals, owner's manuals, maintenance manuals, 
and "how to" books - for example, 
Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag. (Royal CAN vACTM 
Owner's Manual, p. 5.) 
Remove safety wire from access unit adjusting bolt and adjusting link and loosen bolt. (Air 
Force Manual T.O.IF-16C-2-94JG-50-2, Ammunition Drum, Removal and Installation) 
If candle wax falls on a piece of furniture, wait until it solidifies, then pick it off with your 
fingernail or a plastic spatula. (McGowan & DuBern, Home Repair. London: Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd. 1991, p. 22.) 
One application that could benefit from the ability to understand and animate agent behavior 
that would follow from such instructions is task analysis in connection with Computer-Aided 
Design. By enabling virtual human agents to carry out maintenance and repair tasks in the 
CAD environment itself, a designer could determine before the artifacts were built whether 
people would be able to carry out those tasks in anticipated environments. 
There are at least three ways to make different virtual agents interact with objects in different 
virtual environments. One way is through direct manipulation, which would require a designer 
to  directly control a range of different agents in a range of different environments, in order 
to observe and evaluate their behavior. A second way is through direct motion sensing (e.g. 
"Virtual Reality" kinesthetic input [4]). The third way is through Natural Language level 
instructions. This could be the most economical, since it would allow the designer to  simply 
"rerun" the same instructions with different agent-environment pairs, in order to accomplish 
the same ends. 
Other potential application areas for using instructions to  direct the behavior of animated 
agents include group training activities and multi-agent simulations. Thus we feel that enabling 
virtual human agents to understand instructions is of practical as well as theoretical interest. 
2.2 Overview of the AnimNL Architecture 
We begin with a brief overview of the AnimNL architecture, since it captures our beliefs that 
language understanding is a process that evolves, in part, through principled interaction with 
the world. Roughly speaking, AnimNL consists of three interacting modules: 
A module consisting of processes that work towards understanding an instruction step in 
terms of an initial structure of intentions, which we call a plan graph. These processes 
include parsing, interpretation and plan inference [18, 19, 20, 211. 
A module consisting of a high-level incremental planner and two specialized processes able 
to  adapt highly-parameterized plans for search and for object manipulation t o  the exact 
situation at hand [26, 27, 28, 36, 411. 
A simulator that coordinates motion directives and perceptual requests from the planning 
components with ones corresponding to environmental responses, and schedules their per- 
formance. An agenda allows multiple behaviors to  be carried out in parallel, and other 
behaviors t o  be initiated and terminated asyiichronously with respect to  each other [lo]. 
The result is that an agent's behavior at any time reflects both its low-level responses to the cur- 
rent environment and the current state of its high-level intentions. A more detailed description 
of the AnimNL architecture can be found in [53]. 
3 Intentions from Instructions 
Intentions have been identified as a factor in rational behavior by various researchers (e.g., 
[12, 13, 15, 42]), who see them as playing at least two roles: (1) they can constrain the courses 
of action an agent need consider to those consistent with what the agent already plans to  do; and 
(2) they can be used to  determine when an action can be said to be relevant, to  have succeeded 
or to  have failed. 
We have found that goals specified in instructions - which, in the case of positive instructions, 
are goals that agents are being ordered or advised or requested to  adopt as their intentions - 
can also affect (1) how an agent interprets action descriptions in those instructions and (2) how 
the agent behaves in carrying out actions. In the first case, instructions perform a role that 
Chapman's PhD thesis [15] shows can also be performed by the environment. In Chapman's 
work, apparently underspecified instructions are interpreted simply as evidence for a response 
to  the current environment that has already been deemed relevant on the basis of perception. 
Therefore, if a knife can be used either to kill a monster or to  jimmy a door, and if a monster 
is threatening the agent and no door needs to  be jimmied (e.g., to enable the agent to  escape), 
an instruction such as "use the knife" will be understood only as advice to  kill the monster. 
In Section 3.1, we show how goals specified in Natural Language instructions can function 
in a similar way, and in Section 3.2, we comment on how intentions derived from instructions 
can affect low-level behavioral features. We conclude in Section 3.3 with a brief discussion on 
how the action representation used in AnimNL allows its high-level planner t o  use intentions 
effectively. 
3.1 Behavioral Import of Purpose Clauses 
Comments are often made about the eficiency of Natural Language - how much of an utter- 
ance's meaning can be left unspecified, to  be filled in by listeners able to  draw on an appropriate 
context. In this light, we have come to understand that purpose clauses - infinitival clauses 
that convey the goal of an action - provide a helpful source of information for understanding 
underspecified action descriptions which convey information implicitly through context. While 
this information could of course be made explicit, people seem not to  expect this: speakers 
commonly leave it for hearers to  figure out for themselves.' 
Consider the following example (from [la]): 
Place a plank between two ladders to make a simple scaffold. 
The action description in the main clause is "place a plank between two ladders". The goal 
conveyed in the purpose clause is "make a simple scaffold". Now, by itself, the main clause 
conveys no explicit constraints on the orientation of what have to  be two step-ladders and only 
one constraint on the placement of the plank - that it be somewhere in the 3-dimensional space 
"between" wherever the step-ladders are. However there are significant implicit constraints that 
follow from the purpose of making a simple scaffold: the ladders should be aligned with their 
treads facing outwards in opposite directions, at a distance spannable by the plank, which should 
be placed horizontally on treads of the two ladders that are the same height off the ground. (How 
high off the ground will depend on the purpose of the scaffold: it is not determinable from the 
given instruction alone.) An (incremental) plan can then be formulated to  comply with both 
the explicit and implicit contraints on the procedure and its intended result. 
Our second example is intended to show that an agent can use a goal expression and percep- 
tual tests on when that goal is achieved to determine the referent of a noun phrase and hence 
what action he or she is meant to  carry out. The instruction to  be considered is: 
Vacuum the rug or carpet against the direction of the pile to leave it raised. 
'There are, of course, other linguistic means of conveying purpose - free adjuncts [52], means clauses [7, 81, 
and even simple conjunction [24]. Moreover, clauses that convey purpose do serve other functions as well, such 
as making an action description easier to understand [22, 231 or justifying why an action should be done [8]. Our 
point here is simply that any linguistic specification of goals (purpose clauses being a clear example) can serve, 
like the environment, as the context in which an underspecified action description can be elaborated and thereby 
correctly understood. 
To follow this instruction, an agent must know the direction referred to  as "against the direction 
of the pile". If the agent does not know the referent of this phrase before starting, the purpose 
clause ("to leave it raised") can be used to guide his or her search for it. That is, the agent can 
plan to  vacuum a bit in various directions and observe which the direction of sweep leaves the 
pile raised. At this point, the agent can begin to  elaborate a plan for vacuuming the entire rug 
or carpet in that direction and thereby finish the job. 
A further example is related to a matter we return t o  in Section 4, and concerns the ter- 
mination conditions associated with perceptual tests. (The instructions are for removing wine 
stains from a rug or carpet.) 
Blot with clean tissues to  remove any liquid still standing. Sprinkle liberally with 
salt to  extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric. Vacuum up the salt. 
In the first sentence, blotting with clean tissues specifies a type of activity but not the extent 
to  which it should be pursued. (In the terminology of Moens and Steedman [40], it is simply 
a process like "running", not a culminated process like "running a mile" : it has no intrinsic 
endpoint.) How long an agent should blot the stained area comes from the purpose clause "to 
remove any liquid still standing": the agent should plan to  interleave blotting with perception, 
until no standing liquid is left visible. 
The purpose clause in the second sentence conveys in a somewhat different way the condition 
under which the agent can start the final step, vacuuming up the salt. It is not the termination 
point of the sprinkling (which is terminated when the agent decides there is now a "liberal" 
amount of salt on the stain [34]), but that of the subsequent waiting. How long the agent should 
wait comes from the purpose clause "to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric". The 
agent must plan to  interleave waiting with perception, continuing until he perceives that the 
salt is damp (i.e., a change in visual texture). At this point, the salt has extracted as much 
liquid as it can, and the agent can commence vacuuming. 
This example illustrates the complementary relation between intention and expectation: the 
intention to  remove the standing liquid leads to  an expectation that blotting it  will eventually 
accomplish this removal, which in turn leads to an intention to observe the situation, monitoring 
for the expected point at  which no liquid will be left standing. 
To say the above is not to say that an agent's only intentions are those derived from instruc- 
tions, but rather that goals specified in instructions, which the agent may adopt as intentions, 
can provide a context for fully understanding underspecified action description in instructions. 
Di Eugenio has designed and implemented the machinery to  be used in AnimNL for com- 
puting many of the inferences that follow from understanding that the action a described in 
the main clause of an utterance is being done for the purpose .rr described in a purpose clause. 
This relationship between a and .rr can be characterized more specifically as either generation or 
enablement. In generation, executing a under appropriate circumstances is all that is required 
to  achieve K .  In enablement, a brings about circumstances in which .rr can be generated by 
subsequent actions. 
Di Eugenia's approach makes use of both linguistic knowledge and planning knowledge. A 
knowledge base of plan schemata (or recipes) complements a taxonomic structure of action 
descriptions. The latter is represented in Classic [ll] and exploits classif ication to  allow an 
inference algorithm to find related action descriptions. These descriptions index into the knowl- 
edge base of recipes which includes information about generation, enablement and sub-structure 
relationships between actions. The inference algorithms on these linked structures are described 
in detail in [18, 191. 
An instruction may convey to the agent that a generation or enablement relationship holds 
between two actions, without the agent being able to  determine which one, from the text alone. 
This may lead to  confusion when the agent comes to  act on the instruction. For example, recall 
the R o y a l  CAN VAC instruction given in Section 2.1: 
Depress door release button to  open door and expose paper bag. 
(This is from a procedure for replacing the dust bag when it is full.) Whether a generation 
or enablement relation holds between "depressing the button" and "opening the door" will 
depend simply on the orientation of the canister. If the canister is horizontal when the button 
is depressed and the catch released, the door will fall open of its own accord because of gravity. 
In this case, depressing the button will generate opening the door, without the need for further 
action. If however, the agent has up-ended the canister to  make the button more accessible, 
depressing the button will just release the catch: the agent must still grasp the door and pull it 
open. An agent who expected the former may think he didn't press the button hard enough and 
try again, rather than think an additional action was called for. Although this is a relatively 
trivial example, readers will probably recognize the problem. It could be solved by making the 
instruction more specific: 
Holding canister horizontally, depress door release button to  open door and expose 
paper bag. 
However, making the text longer seems to decrease the likelihood that it will be read. Trying 
to convey the information graphically [25] relies on the reader distinguishing between necessary 
features of the depicted scene and accidental ones. This suggests that producing instructions of 
guaranteed reliability may be an impossible task. 
3.2 Intentions and Behavioral Features 
In the previous section, we distinguished two relations, generation and enablernent, holding 
between an action and its current purpose. Viewing purpose in terms of an agent's intention to  
achieve i t ,  we now discuss the need we have discovered, to take account of that intention when 
computing low-level features of the action to be performed and animated. Such features may 
include the place at which the agent locates itself to perform the action, and the manner in 
which it grasps an object involved in the action or moves it. While our current implementation 
of this capability is simply via table look-up, a more general and extensible solution is being 
pursued [36] for a wide class of object manipulation tasks. In the meanwhile, we believe it is 
still worthwhile to  illustrate the phenomenon, if only by example, since such a difference can be 
made to human figure animation by a figure's carrying out a task-related action "naturally", 
even when particular behavioral choices are not necessary to  simply the success of the specified 
action. 
Our first example involves the region in which an object will be grasped. If a hammer is 
t o  be grasped simply to  enable it to be moved from place to place, any region of the hammer 
is a viable grasp location, although somewhere near its center of mass may make it easier for 
the agent t o  lift and transport. If however, the hammer is to be grasped to enable its use in 
hammering a nail, a more appropriate grasp region would be towards the end of its shank. Even 
then, re-orientation may be required, once the hammer is lifted. 
Our second example involves constraints on an agent's target in moving to a location. Con- 
sider the simple instruction 
Go over to  the mirror. 
By itself, this tells an agent little about where he or she is supposed to end up being positioned 
with respect to the mirror. On the other hand, specifying a goal that will be enabled by reaching 
a target location can help an agent to better identify that location. For example, 
Go over to  the mirror and straighten it. 
Go over to  the mirror and straighten your bow tie.3 
Straightening a mirror requires manipulating it ,  so an agent will target a comfortable arm's 
reach. Straightening one's bow tie requires seeing oneself clearly: this may target a location 
either closer to  or further away from the mirror, depending on the agent's eyesight. Note that 
the instructor may not know enough about the agent to specify a target location in more detail: 
it is something that only the agent can determine. Thus no further explicit guidance can be 
provided. 
The capabilities of our existing implementation are demonstrated in an animated simulation 
of "SodaJack", a soda fountain agent who can respond to requests for a soda or ice cream [28]. 
In this domain, the intention to  perform a basic task action such as moving a glass so as to  
g e n e r a t e  serving it to  a "customer", posts a constraint on the agent's movements that the glass 
not be tipped to one side. On the other hand, moving a glass so as to e n a b l e  wiping it off posts 
no such constraint. While a few simple things such as these can be done by table look-up, the 
problem of systematically characterizing those features of intended actions that affect low-level 
physical activity is of considerable difficulty. While the significance of this boundary between 
symbol and action has been recognized and formalized in [33], much more work is needed in 
order to actually cross it .  
3These are examples of purposive "and", mentioned earlier in footnote 2 and discussed in more detail in [24]. 
The "and" form sounds more natural here than the "to" form. 
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3.3 Intentions in Means/End Reasoning 
Given that instructions only convey certain features of an agent's behavior, situated decision 
making is necessary to  expand and amplify the agent's intentions, to  fill in gaps. To enable 
decision making to use an agent's intentions effectively, we have found it  worth replacing fixed 
set of preconditions, with reasoning about the effects of actions in the context in which they will 
be performed. 
This reflects our analysis of preconditions [27] as encoding claims about the universal desir- 
ability or undesirability of certain effects of an action. For example, failing to  clear off a block 
before picking it up, may mean that objects on top of it will slide off and break or disturb other 
objects. Sometimes an agent will be concerned about this possibility; other times, not. (We 
assume that agents may desire to avoid particular actions or actions that may lead to  particular 
states.) The problem with fixed preconditions is that they prevent an agent from considering 
an action, even if the agent doesn't care about its possibly destructive side-effects. 
Limited simulation, on the other hand, can enable an agent to reason roughly about the 
effects of performing an action in a given world state. The agent can then decide whether or not 
performing the action will satisfy his intentions without violating any behavioral constraints. In 
some cases, the consequences will be acceptable given the agent's current intentions, in other 
cases, they won't. This use of situated reasoning through limited simulation allows the system 
to use intentions to  define, in a situation-specific way, when an action is applicable and can 
be successful rather than using an a pr io r i  definition. (Another use of limited simulation in 
planning are discussed in [38] .) 
The removal of preconditions from action operators has multiple effects. One benefit is to  
give the system more flexibility in choosing which actions to use to achieve its ends. However, 
the cost of this increased flexibility is that actions may fail to achieve these ends. In short, using 
intentions and limited simulation to  perform action selection means the possibility of action 
failure must be allowed for. 
The current version of AnimNL's planner, which eliminates preconditions in favor of situated 
reasoning about the effects of actions, is described in more detail in [26, 271. 
4 Expectations from Instructions 
Here we address the role of instructions in raising expec ta t i ons  that complement an agent's cur- 
rent perceptions in influencing its behavior. Expectations can lead to  further perceptual activity 
- not just observation but also activities that enable observation. As such, expectations from 
instructions complement the signals coming in from the outside world. Here we discuss three 
types of expectations generated by different elements in instruction, and the "active perception" 
[6] they can engender. 
4.1 Expectations about Processes 
In some earlier work designed for creating animations from recipes, Karlin [34] analysed a 
range of temporal and frequency adverbs found in instructions. One particular construction she 
analysed is the following: 
Do a for <duration> or until <event> 
e.g. Steam two minutes or until mussels open. 
Karlin notes that this is not a case of logical disjunction, where the agent can choose which 
disjunct to follow: rather, the explicit duration suggests the usual amount of time that it will 
take to  just cook the mussels. This can be detected when all the mussels that were closed when 
they were put into the pot (already open ones having been discarded as dead) are now open. If 
they are not open after two minutes, the agent should wait a bit longer. Those that have not 
opened after another short wait should then be discarded, since they are full of mud. 
The usefulness of an expectation such as this comes from the cost of sensing. Steaming is 
usually done in a closed, opaque cooking pot, so the lid must be removed in order to  check 
the state of the contents. Whenever this is done, steam escapes, setting the process back. The 
result of sensing too often then is that the mussels become tough through over-cooking. The 
expectation can therefore be used to  gauge how long to wait before beginning to make costly 
sensing tests. 
4.2 Expectations about Consequences 
Processes often have more than one possible outcome, depending on how long they proceed 
and how much resources they consume. Another type of expectation arising from instructions 
concerns the properties of objects that will result from such processes. (This is described in 
more detail in [51].) 
Consider for example, mixing flour, butter and water.4 Depending on the relative amounts 
of these three ingredients and the absorbency of the flour (different for different types of flour 
and for winter and summer wheat), the result may be anything from a flakey mass to a viscous 
batter. Instructions can indicate the intended result, so that the agent can modify and/or 
augment his actions so as to  produce it. How instructions convey the intended result can vary: 
In Example la-c, the expected viscosity of the resulting mixture is conveyed through the verb: 
l a .  Mix the flour, butter and water, and knead until smooth and shiny. 
b. Mix the flour, butter and water, and spread over the blueberries. 
c. Mix the flour, butter and water, and stir until all lumps are gone. 
while in Example 2a-b, it is conveyed through the noun phrase: 
4This is not something we are capable of animating without simulating the properties of semi-viscous fluids, 
but it is the best example for making our point. 
2a. Mix the flour, butter and water. Let the dough relax for 15 minutes. 
b. Mix the flour, butter and water. Let the batter sit for 15 minutes. 
There are several ways in which expectations such as these can affect an agent's behavior. The 
simplest is to  monitor the result: if it doesn't meet the agent's expectation (too liquid or too 
solid), the agent can compensate with additional amounts of flour in the former case or water 
in the latter. Alternatively, the agent can monitor the process: that is, he can add the specified 
amount of water t o  the specified amounts of butter and flour gradually, mixing it  in. If it is 
becoming too viscous, he can stop before adding all the ingredients. 
4.3 Expectations about Locations 
Actions can effect changes in the world that alter what an agent can perceive. Part of an 
agent's cognitive task in understanding instructions is therefore to determine for each referring 
expression, the perceptual context in which the agent is meant to find (or ground) its referent. 
Some referring expressions in an instruction may be intended to refer to  objects in the currently 
perceivable situation, while others may be intended to refer to objects that only appear (i.e., 
come into existence or become perceivable) as a consequence of carrying out an action specified 
in the instruction. 
The difference can be seen by comparing the following two instructions 
3a. Go into Fred's office and get me the red file folder. 
b. Go into Fred's office and refile the red file folder. 
At issue is the referent of the expression "the red file folder". In (3a), it is clearly the red file 
folder that the listener will find in Fred's office, a file folder whose existence the listener may 
previously have not been aware of. That is, (3a) leads a listener to  develop the expectation that 
after they perform the initial action and go into Fred's office, they will be in a context in which 
it makes sense to  determine the referent of "the red file folder". In contrast, given instruction 
(3b), it is reasonable for a listener to first try to  ground "the red file folder" in the context 
in which the instruction is given. If successful, the listener can then go into Fred's office and 
refile it. If unsuccessful though, a listener will not just take the instruction to  be infelicitous (as 
they would in the case of an instruction like "Pick up the file folder", if there were currently 
no file folder around).. Rather they will adopt the same locational expectation as in the first 
example, that the red file folder is in Fred's office. What is especially interesting is the strength 
of this expectation: a cooperative agent will look around, if an object isn't where they expect 
it t o  be until they find it. This has led Moore to develop flexible procedures he calls search 
plans [41] following [39], that can be used to  guide an agent in grounding both definite and 
indefinite referring expressions. Moore's search plans are able to incorporate expectations about 
the context in which a referring expression will receive its intended grounding, to  limit search. 
In AnimNL, Di Eugenio has attempted to derive some of these expectations through plan 
inference techniques described in more detail in [19, 201. In this case, the inferences are of the 
form: if one goes to  place p for the purpose of doing action a, then expect to do a at p. If a 
has among its applicabiIity condi t ions  - conditions that must hold for a to make sense, in terms 
of its potential for success in the circumstances [35, 44, 491 - that one or more of its argument 
be at its performance site p ,  then a locational expectation develops as in (3a). If not, a weaker 
expectation arises, as in (3b). (Notice that this can even arise on the basis of a single clause: 
"Bring me the red file folder from downstairs" leads to a similar expectation as (3a), while 
"Give the man downstairs the red file folder" leads to  a similar expectation as (3b). Haas [31], 
citing examples such as "Pick up the book behind you", points out a problem with indexical 
descriptions such as "the book behind you". A listener must decide whether such descriptions 
are to be grounded before they act - in this case, so that it makes sense to  turn around to see 
the book in order to pick it  up - or whether they must act on the description as given.) 
In addition to  expectations concerning the location of an object satisfying a particular de- 
scription, an agent may also develop expectations concerning the particular description that 
needs to  be satisfied. Here, an instruction like "Open the paint can" is more illustrative than 
"Get the book". An agent who simply seeks to  ground the expression "the paint can" in its 
current situation may identify several objects of type "paint can". On the other hand, an agent 
who expects to  be able to  open the referent of "the paint can" will seek to  ground a more specific 
expression such as "the closed paint can" or "the paint can that needs opening" .5 
5 Conclusion 
The central theme of this special issue is "principled characterizations of agent-environment 
interactions". What we have tried to  characterize in this short position paper are ways in which 
agents' understanding and use of instructions can complement what they can derive from the 
environment in which they act, lessons we have learned from attempting a complete vertical 
integration from Natural Language instructions to  animated human figures. We have focussed 
on two attitudes that contribute to agents' behavior - their intentions and their expectations - 
and shown how Natural Language in the form of instructions provides a source of such attitudes 
in ways that complement the environment. We have also made the point that instructions can 
require more than one context of interpretation. Thus agents' understanding of instructions will 
evolve as their activity progresses. Understanding instructioiis is thus not a one-shot process 
that occurs entirely prior to activity. Language understanding is not just something that takes 
place "at the front end" 
5This is similar, in some ways, to Haddock's "the rabbit in the hat" example [30] in which the phrase as a 
whole may refer uniquely in a context, even though neither of its component noun phrases ("the rabbit" and 
"the hat") do. Haddock's solution makes use of constraint satisfaction, the "in" relation constraining possible 
rabbit referents to ones that are in hats and possible hat referents to ones that contain rabbits. 
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